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Abstract
Supply chains are facing numerous changes contributing to their increase in
complexity and vulnerability to disruptions. Subsequently, decision-makers lack a
transparent, generalizable tool to quantify supply chain resilience and assess additional
resilience investments. This research facilitates a more profound understanding of the
intricacies and interrelation of supply chain nodes and constructs. It integrates the Area
under the Curve (AUC) metric to quantify performance or any organizational measure of
competitive advantage amid a disruption. Due to its structural resemblance to various
organizational platforms, the subset United States Air Force (USAF) F-16 engine repair
and supply network is modeled employing discrete-event simulation. The purpose of this
study is to evaluate investments in inventory and capacity resilience levers to understand
how mitigation strategies affect supply chain entity performance. Results indicate that
simultaneous investments in these levers yield the most significant effects on resilience.
The presented analysis asserts recovery capacity and response time as the most
significant recovery influencers following a disruption. Additionally, two design
scenarios are further examined to understand how flexibility influences resilience.
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RESILIENT MAINTENANCE INFRASTRUCTURE: DYNAMIC REPAIR
NETWORK DESIGNS TO EFFECTIVELY MANAGE SUPPLY CHAIN
DISRUPTIONS
I. Introduction
Background
A key dynamic within present-day businesses and corporations is that supply chains
compete, not the companies themselves. Getting the right product, at the right place, at the
right time to the consumer is pivotal to competitive success and survival (Christopher &
Towill, 2001). Global-spanning operations, coupled with complexity, have driven
organizational supply chains to grow and expand (Christopher & Peck, 2004).
Subsequently, as supply chains have lengthened, reliance on strategic partners has risen,
creating increased vulnerability to failure through and between critical nodes (Amin, 2002).
The business environment is becoming more turbulent as the globalization of procurement
and distribution yields more complex supply chains. Increased emphasis on outsourcing
and a greater focus on supplier nodes deteriorate flexibility within supply bases (Pettit,
Croxton, & Fiksel, 2019). Moreover, as companies employ lean or efficiency-driven
concepts, they also introduce limitations that subject their respective supply chains to
heightened, volatile conditions (Pettit et al., 2019).
Concurrently, crises of various magnitudes and proportions affect an organization’s
supply chain. Crises, interchangeable with ‘environmental jolts,’ are defined as “transient
perturbations whose occurrences are difficult to foresee and whose impacts on
organizations are disruptive and potentially inimical” (Meyer, 1982). Thus, jolts can be
delineated into external events affecting an organization, such as opportunities, threats,
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crises, or catastrophes (Billings, Milburn, & Schaalman, 1980). Moreover, amid various
unknown environmental jolts, organizations recognize the need to shift to a robust posture
but fail to understand the mechanics to do so as robustness is inadequately defined (Pettit,
Fiksel, & Croxton, 2010).
As a result, during a crisis, the rapid and unexpected organizational change that
must occur often renders existing strategies obsolete (Wan & Yiu, 2009). In 2008, a global
financial crisis triggered a global market cap loss of 19.4 trillion dollars, a 46 percent
decline compared to 2007. The lingering effects surged 208 thousand businesses filing
bankruptcy between 2008 to 2010 (Garelli, 2009). In 2020, the coronavirus (COVID-19),
originating in Wuhan, China, burdened the world economy. Global outputs dropped by 1%,
translating to a per month loss of approximately 40 billion dollars in China and 65 billion
dollars globally, indicating the decline of the hub of supply chains inside and outside of
China by 40% (Luo, Kwok, & Tsang, 2020). Inherently, several manufacturers such as Fiat
Chrysler Automobiles, Hyundai, and Apple decided to adjust or halt production due to the
inability to facilitate parts’ supply for sustained performance (Haren, P. & Simchi-Levi, D.
2020).
Inherently, there is an evidentiary tradeoff between vulnerabilities and capabilities
in pursuit of supply chain efficiency and organizational success. Such resolve and desire
for competitive advantage demand a fully integrated and efficient supply chain, usually
compromising risk mitigation capabilities elsewhere (Christopher & Peck, 2004;
Ponomarov, 2012).
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Motivation
Supply chain uncertainty and risks have dramatically increased based on several
interrelated growing trends in consumer expectation, global competition, and more
complex and longer supply chains. Additionally, decision-makers must manage supply
variability and capacity constraints within an environment susceptible to environmental
jolts (Masteika & Čepinskis, 2015; Sheffi & Rice, 2005). Supply chains must not only be
capable of withstanding the stressors of this tumultuous environment but within acceptable
degradation parameters and to recover within an acceptable timeframe and reasonable costs
(Zobel & Khansa, 2012).
The ability for an organization to withstand the impact of disruption has been
traversed comprehensively in the literature. Approaches to conceptualize an organization’s
disruption resilience and resistance have been predominately qualitative. Furthermore, the
proper organizational actions warranted to facilitate resilience remains unclear throughout
the research (Falasca, Zobel, & Cook, 2008). The remaining limited quantitative research
generally leverages survey-based strategies rather than encompassing rigorous
mathematical analysis of resilience. Finally, research tends to focus on disruption
mitigation or response measures without assessing a conjoined phase perspective (Falasca
et al., 2008; Munoz & Dunbar, 2015).
This study progresses resilience-based research through a militaristic lens,
particularly the USAF’s F-16 engine repair network. Holistically, the organizational supply
construct and design are with little variation to those found with public and private sectors.
It serves as a viable comparison, imposed with various environmental vulnerabilities and
peer-nation capabilities, driven by the aspiration of competitive advantage and
3

organizational success. Like many infrastructures, the USAF F-16 engine repair network
features integration between supply and repair capabilities, mainly referred to as Repair
Network Integration (RNI). This construct leverages supply and repair networks throughout
various supply nodes to maximize overall Aircraft Availability (AA), a comparative metric
to public and private sector competitive advantage-based metric (Bihansky, 2018; deSouza
& Haddud, 2017). The RNI philosophy establishes three tiers of aviation maintenance,
repair, and overhaul (MRO), entailing Organizational-Level (O-level), Intermediate-Level
(I-level), and Depot-Level (D-Level) repair capabilities. This construct is equivalent to the
airline industry’s maintenance echelons, wherein airports and fixed-base operators offer
maintenance shops. These certified entities perform rudimentary and routine maintenance
functions, similarly to I-Level and O-Level repair. Within the airline industry, overhaul or
D-Level repair is conducted by a manufacturer such as Boeing or Lockheed Martin.
By design, the majority of repair within the chain occurs at O-level. This high
concentration of capability reflects many public and private sector supply chains, wherein
centralization sparks fragility to failure, perturbation, and disruption. When affected by
such, the jolt rapidly propagates through the network, heavily compromising the system’s
function (Piccardi & Tajoli, 2018). Hence, if a centralized node experiences a disruption,
the capability to sustain competitive advantage is significantly decremented.
Problem Statement
Organizational decision-makers and leaders alike must strike a balance between
supply chain vulnerabilities and capabilities (Pettit et al., 2010). The inherent complexity of
supply chain networks and associated effects of risks make environmental jolts or
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disruptions challenging to forecast and manage; therefore, organizations must adequately
assure a supply chain capable of resisting unanticipated disruptions and quickly recovering
from them (Li & Zobel, 2020). Hence, decision-makers must be afforded a malleable tool
and metric to quantify, assess, and anticipate the influence of inventory capacity and
production on disruption susceptibility and recovery performance (Femano et al., 2019;
Shannon, 2020).
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this research is to stimulate further clarity of the interrelatedness of
organizational supply chains utilizing the USAF’s F-16 engine repair network. This
research further empowers a generalizable tool and methodology to measure network
resilience quantifiably. Subsequently, it assesses the incremental and cumulative changes in
resilience based on the range of investment in specified resilience capability factors.
Moreover, this research postulates the use of the Area Under the Curve (AUC) metric as a
suitable measure of AA rate by which the network can support over time (Femano et al.,
2019).
Research Questions
This research further explores the following question to more adequately gauge how
investments in resilience affect organizational ability to perform before and following a
disruption. Notably, this research assesses:
How do the investments in inventory and production capacity influence the USAF’s F-16
aircraft engine repair network (Operational, Intermediate, and Depot-level repair) level of
resilience when affected by an unexpected disruption?
5

Investigative Questions
Subsequently, there are several investigative questions necessary to answer the
posed research question further.
1. What is the current layout of the F16 aircraft engine repair network in the USAF?
2. In its current state, how resistant is the repair network to a disruption?
3. What design or investments permit the greatest range of resilience within the repair
infrastructure?
Research Focus
The research question and investigative questions are answered through discreteevent simulation (DES) modeling and subsequent mathematical analysis, quantifying
resilience levels based on varying investment levels. A thorough, exhaustive literature
review recognizes the following literature streams: (1) General Resilience Strategies, (2)
Investment in Resilience, (3) Production, Capacity, and Inventory, (4) Long-chain
Flexibility, and (5) Dynamic Capabilities and Agility. Subsequently, the engine network is
modeled to reflect the real system dynamics, yielding an accurate depiction of the supply
and repair network. Sequentially, various investment scenarios are applied to the model to
quantify resilience and identify means of maximizing overall supply chain resilience.
II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
Through the further review of existing literature, an evident gap emerges as there is
no specific, generalizable tool and methodology for decision-makers to gauge resilience
and its response to incremental changes in investments. Generally, relevant research
6

qualitatively addresses supply chain resilience with little support of quantitative measures.
This research closes the gap between qualitative and quantitative research by developing a
DES framework for assessing resilience from a quantifiable perspective. Further emphasis
on the gap is visible as literature streams encircle (1) General Resilience Strategies, (2)
Investment in Resilience, (3) Production, Capacity, and Inventory, (4) Long-chain
Flexibility, and (5) Dynamic Capabilities and Agility.
General Resilience Strategies
Definitions of resilience are seen within an array of segments to include physical,
ecological, economy, disaster management, engineering, and organizational research
(Kochan & Nowicki, 2018). Christopher and Peck (2004) were the first to apply the
ecosystem definition of resilience to the realm of supply chain management and devise the
notion of supply chain resilience (SCR). Subsequently, SCR is defined as “the ability of a
system to return to its original state or move to a new, more desirable state after being
disturbed” (Christopher & Peck, 2004). SCR has increasingly gained attention and
popularity within the last fifteen years, spanning various researchers and experts who
attempt to conceptualize the definition further and develop a mechanism to comprehend,
measure, and bolster resilience within an organization’s supply infrastructure (Macdonald,
Zobel, Melnyk, & Griffis, 2018a; Min, Zacharia, & Smith, 2019; Portillo Bollat, 2009).
The concept has also been redefined in several instances. Sheffi and Rice (2005) define
SCR as “An organization’s ability to recover from a disruption quickly can be improved by
building redundancy and flexibility into its supply chain.” Based on the varying definitions
throughout the literature and lack of clarity in relationships between supply chain resilience
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and its constraints, there are divergent concepts in theory building (Kochan & Nowicki,
2018). Following a thorough meta-analysis of the literature, Ponomarov (2012)
consolidated and derived resilience as “The adaptive capability of the supply chain to
prepare for unexpected events, respond to disruptions, and recover from them by
maintaining continuity of operations at the desired level of connectedness and control over
structure and function.” Thus, this research recognizes Ponomarov (2012) as the
foundational and prevailing designation of supply chain resilience.
Initial measures towards decreasing vulnerability within a supply infrastructure can
be dated to the late 1990s, when market power shifted from manufacturers to retailers.
Customers required significant degrees of customization to fit desired needs. Moreover,
competitive globalization increased as the distances between product source and market
consumption expanded geographically, seeking higher quality or lower costs (Min et al.,
2019; Zubair, Khan, Farooq, & Rasheed, 2019).
As organizations lengthen their supply chains by outsourcing their functions,
resources, and information, they inherently become larger and more complex.
Consequently, they face increased vulnerability and potential inability to effectively
recover from an environmental jolt or disruption (Christopher & Peck, 2004). The
heightened vulnerability can further proliferate to other firms or nodes within the chain
based on supply chains' complexity and various nodes' interconnectedness. Many
organizations are unaware of their susceptibility to a disruption or what it entails.
Disruptions, categorized as natural or human-made, combined with supply chain
complexity and global competition have further exacerbated networks to becoming more
vulnerable (Kochan & Nowicki, 2018). Innately, a supply chain does have general
8

fluctuations. Steady-state system performance is expected to change gradually, where
normal fluctuations generate minor performance fluctuations. Disruptions maintain a
distinct effect on overall performance, abruptly altering performance metrics. Such metrics
(profits, customer service, sales, production levels, etcetera) are organization-specific but
commonly support an organization’s desire for competitive advantage. The dynamic
integration of logistical capabilities enables SCR, resulting in a sustainable competitive
advantage as depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Relationship between Logistical Capabilities, SCR, and Competitive Advantage
(S. Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009)
Subsequently, the greater the SCR, the greater the competitive advantage (S.
Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009; S. Y. Ponomarov, 2012)
There are several organizational stages in conjunction with a disruption (Falasca
et al., 2008). Sheffi & Rice (2005) outlined the impact a disruption can have on an entity or
supply chain can be assessed within the following series of numbered stages: (1)
Preparation, (2) Disruptive Event, (3) First Response, (4) Initial Impact, (5) Full Impact, (6)
Preparation for Recovery, (7) Recovery, and (8) Recovery. As illustrated in Figure 2, the
9

most critical stage is the preparation stage, when the network is at a steady state of
operations. The starting preparation performance value influences the level at which
performance drops and remains when entering stage six (Shannon, 2020). Upon realization
of the disruption, decision nodes are levied to determine how recovery will be achieved.
Moreover, the recovery stage is essential as it garners organizational investments to reach a
new steady state.

Figure 2. Stages of Disruption (Sheffi & Rice, 2005)
Craighead, Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, and Handfield (2007) assert disruptions are
unavoidable, yet organizations tend to be reactive rather than proactive. Additionally,
organizations' unawareness of how to implement and quantify resilience has further
perpetuated organizational vulnerabilities and susceptibility. Furthermore, although disaster
recovery planning and crisis management do occur, it is often accomplished in isolation
rather than a cohesive nature or industry-wide approach required to reduce vulnerability
(Christopher & Peck, 2004).
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Resilience is pivotal to withstanding such disruptions, yet the actions needed to facilitate
resilience to the crisis remain unclear throughout the literature (Kunc & Bandahari, 2011).
Research suggests that supply chain resilience is a concept that is not fully comprehended,
whereby many organizations lack the awareness or necessity to consider resilience within
their supply chains as an approach to risk management (Christopher & Peck, 2004). Sheffi
and Rice (2005) assert resilience as achievable when assessed as a function of an
organization’s competitive position and responsiveness to its supply chain. Companies that
incorporate flexibility and redundancy within their supply chain essentially bolster their
resilience. When disruptions occur, the system experiences a triangular response, declining
system performance, and gradually recovers to a new steady state. Zobel and Khansa
(2012) then provided an extension to Sheffi and Rice’s (2005) work utilizing a triangular
model to quantify resilience, as demonstrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Predicted Resilience (Zobel & Khansa, 2012)
This design permitted the measurement of the Area Above the Curve. Melnyk, Zobel,
MacDonald, and Griffis (2014) expound on this design by modifying Sheffi and Rice’s
disaster stages and incorporating Zobel and Khansa’s (2012) resilience triangle as
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illustrated in Figure 4. This model assesses the transient states of the system response when
affected by a disruption to serve as a measurement of the network’s collective resilience.
Within the figure, transient states serve as stages or critical periods upon the onset of a
disruption. Notably, the organization remains within a steady-state until the period at which
the triggering event is enacted (TD). Next, the system is studied based on its decline (TO),
marking the visible onset of the disruptions affects until the point at which the disruption
reaches its climax (TC) and time to system recovery (TP).

Figure 4. Time Series Critical Points (Melnyk et al., 2014)
The larger the integral, the less resistant the system is against a disruption (Melnyk et al.,
2014).
This research assesses resilience via the employment of AUC, a more accurate
measurement of network performance over the disruption timeframe and parallel parameter
as researchers Zobel and Khansa (2012) and Macdonald, Zobel, Melnyk, and Griffis
(2018b). The utilization of AUC to assess resilience is continuously growing. Macdonald et
al. (2018) and those within various academic disciplines, including inventory control,
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psychology, physiology, and information security, validate this form measurement as the
relative decline sustained from the disruption. Melnyk et al. (2014) validate this approach,
claiming AUC successfully considers and characterizes the tradeoffs between the total
amount of system-loss and the total recovery curve. Furthermore, it enables demand
forecasting capability utilizing predetermined assets within the midst of the disruption
(Shannon, 2020).
Investments in Resilience
Christopher & Peck (2004) identified four fundamental principles to bolster
resilience in the event of a disruption: “(1) resilience can be built into a system in advance
of a disruption, (2) a high level of collaboration is required to identify and manage risks,
(3) agility is essential to react quickly to unforeseen events, and (4) the culture of risk
management is a necessity.” Based on these aspects, fourteen capability factors were
devised as depicted in Table 1. These capability factors serve as a framework for measuring
resilience and determining a resilience score (Chowdhury & Quaddus, 2017). Kochan and
Nowicki (2018) suggest investments in these capability factors promote flexibility and
redundancy. Flexibility relates to infrastructure and resources before they are needed and
restructuring previously existing capacity, whereas redundancy pertains to maintaining the
capacity to respond to disruptions and adequately sustain operations (Kochan & Nowicki,
2018). Inclusion and application of flexibility and redundancy serve to improve
organizational capabilities and reduce vulnerabilities.
Pettit et al. (2010) introduced the concept of ‘Zone of Resilience,’ advancing three
propositions to achieve balance. (1) Excessive vulnerabilities relative to capabilities will
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cause excessive risk, (2) Excess capabilities relative to vulnerabilities will degrade
organizational profitability, and (3) a balanced approach improves supply chain
performance and resilience. Moreover, agencies abiding by the first two unbalanced
propositions are unsustainable for long-term operations and naturally will become
uncompetitive (Pettit et al., 2010).
SCR was adopted to bolster supply chain infrastructures in order to sustain competitive
capability. However, it is imperative for corporations, businesses, publicly and privately
owned, to strike a balance between supply chain capabilities and vulnerabilities (Pettit et
al., 2010).
Primarily, two categories of mitigation capabilities moderate the severity of a disruption
to the supply chain: recovery and warning. Mitigation capabilities are defined as agencybased routines, patterns, and actions that, when bundled with resources, enhance the supply
chain’s abilities to recover expeditiously from disruption or create awareness of a pending
or realized disruption (Craighead et al., 2007). Recovery capabilities foster coordination of
resources to return the network to its pre-disruption steady state, whereas warning
capabilities disseminate information about an impeding disruption through nodes within the
network (Craighead et al., 2007). Collectively, mitigation techniques contribute to reducing
loss, speed of recovery response, and exposure to disruption.

14

Table 1. Capability Factors (Pettit et al., 2010)
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Moreover, simultaneous deployment and investment in mitigation techniques can enhance
supply chain performance and competitiveness (Carvalho, Azevedo, & Cruz-Machado,
2012). Investment in isolation leads to inefficiencies in improving resilience within the
system (Femano et al., 2019). Subsequently, this research employs this rationale,
simultaneously balancing investments in production, capacity, and inventory.
Ivanov (2017) expounded upon the mitigation strategies utilizing discrete-event
simulation (DES) to explore the effects of inventory buffer and backup sourcing on supply
chain performance. Utilizing a three-stage supply chain comprised of a supplier,
distribution centers, and customer, varying capacity levels were modeled to assess the
range of mitigation to a disruption. Models with elevated capacity were more sufficiently
prepared and equipped to withstand the disruption. Moreover, while capacity affords
mitigation capability, responsiveness or speed of response is crucial. The speed by which
the system can recover quickly influences resilience with the chain (Gligor, Gligor,
Holcomb, & Bozkurt, 2019; Pires Ribeiro & Barbosa-Povoa, 2018). Ultimately,
responsiveness or speed can be more influential than capacity (Femano et al., 2019).
Production Capacity versus Inventory
Supply chain resilience is multifaceted, comprising of several internal and external
processes and environmental interactions. Intrinsically, tradeoffs plague and prevent
organizations from achieving the highest ranges of resilience. Specifically, resilience is
closely related to efficiency and redundancy’s tradeoff, which is also analogous to the
tradeoff of Cost and Service Level (Ivanov & Rozhkov, 2017). Investments in resilience
further emphasize the tradeoffs of maximizing system capability. Particularly, decisionmakers must choose between enabling faster repairs (referred to as production capacity)
16

and allocating more inventory on a tactical level (Basten & van Houtum, 2014; Rappold &
Van Roo, 2009).
Ivanov & Rozhkov (2017) employed simulation to understand how disruption can affect
a firm’s production capacity. These researchers incorporated real data from a fast-moving
consumer goods company to derive practical recommendations on inventory, on-time
delivery, and service level control metrics. Modeling a disruption, production capacity
immediately experienced a 50% decrease. Investments in capacity buffers and a backup
facility as additional capacity reservations partially mitigated the reduction in overall
production and capacity and performance level (Ivanov & Rozhkov, 2017).

Assessing its

effect on inventory, Ivanov & Rozhkov (2017) found increases in inventory tempered the
effects of multiple short-term disruptions and singular extended duration disruptions. Thus,
if capacity or inventory mitigation techniques are increased without supplementing the
other respectively, the full resilience potential will not be realized (Femano et al., 2019).
Long-Chain Flexibility
Literature attests flexibility as a prime determinant of supply chain resilience, indicating
an organization’s propensity to respond to a disruption adequately. Flexibility is pivotal as
it serves as firms’ ability and enterprising to adapt themselves to the dynamically changing
environment within minimal effort (Hosseini, Ivanov, & Dolgui, 2019). Grigore (2007)
defines flexibility as the ability to adapt, remaining operational in changing conditions, and
completely different or not from the conditions known in advance. Flexibility may increase
organizational service level, cost, and applied practices such as flexible transportation and
sourcing can contribute to resiliency within supply chains (Hosseini et al., 2019; Ivanov,
Sokolov, & Dolgui, 2014).
17

Collectively, a flexible supply chain infrastructure is essential to mitigating
vulnerabilities. Saghafian & Van Oyen (2016) posit that a critical strategy for achieving
robustness is increasing the supply base’s flexibility. Firms can institute backup capacity,
thus flexibility, by having a dedicated backup supplier for products or extra inventories.
More economically friendly, flexibility is achievable by having a single pooled flexible
backup supplier capable of assuring supply continuity at a given capacity level (Saghafian
& Van Oyen, 2016). Supply chains can also become more flexible by adapting production
and delivery quantities to respond in shifts or changes in supply (Shekarian, Reza Nooraie,
& Parast, 2020).
Total flexibility can be financially draining for an organization; therefore, limited
flexibility remains a viable option and can yield most of the total flexibility benefits. Jordan
& Graves (1995) introduced the “long-chain” flexibility concept conjoining production
plants and products. Within this construct, two capabilities are afforded: each plant can
produce various products, and multiple plants can produce more than one product (Deng &
Shen, 2013). Total flexibility, wherein each plant (depicted as a square in Figures 5 and 6)
can produce every product (depicted as a circle in Figures 5 and 6), is inadvisable.
However, rather limited flexibility is achievable by each plant producing an additional
product. The design differences between full and limited flexibility are significant, yet from
a capability perspective, the limited flexibility yields results similar to the total flexibility
illustrated in Figure 5. Furthermore, Jordan and Graves (1995) employ one and three chain
(interchangeable with “long-chain”), limited flexibility approaches with ten links to meet
demand.
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Figure 5. Flexibility Configurations with Equal Flexibility Benefits (Jordan & Graves, 1995)

The limited flexibility approaches yield a capacity utilization of 86.6%, whereas total
flexibility increases capacity utilization to 94.7%. The differences between limited and total
flexibility are negligible when factoring in the astronomical costs associated with closing
the utilization gap between limited and total flexibility (Jordan & Graves, 1995).
Deng & Shen (2013) builds on the essential intuition from limited flexibility research,
representing the chain as a circle and further refining the following chaining guidelines:
(a) equalizing the number of plants to which each product is directly connected.
(b) equalizing the number of products to which each plant is directly connected.
(c) creating a circuit that encompasses as many plants as possible (Deng & Shen,
2013).
Chaining guidelines are graphically depicted in Figure 6 as a circular representation of the
long-chain.
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Figure 6. Three Chain Configuration and Its Circular Representation (Deng & Shen, 2013)
The limited flexibility strategy will be employed throughout this research and referred to as
a “long-chain” design.
Dynamic Capability
Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997) address how firms could develop and sustain a resilient
posture introducing the Theory of Dynamic Capabilities (DC), facilitating a competitive
advantage guideline. Dynamic capabilities are defined as “the ability of an organization and
its management to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competencies to
address rapidly changing environments (Teece et al., 1997). Others have added to the
definition to include strategic decision making wherein managers pool various business,
functional, and personal expertise to shape the significant strategic moves (Eisenhardt &
Martin, 2000). Firms must leverage the levers of sensing, seizing, and transforming or
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reconfiguring. Sensing is the organization determining or gauging the timing or opportunity
to invest and determining how potential competitors may respond. Seizing entails
mobilizing resources to address and exploit such opportunities (Teece et al., 1997).
Transforming is continued renewal through guiding policy or coherent action.
Multiple firms have adopted this theory within respective supply chains, furthering
extending its conceptions throughout numerous facets. SCR and DC are recently
interweaving, providing a platform for more resilient, secure supply chain networks
(Masteika & Čepinskis, 2015). Supply chain resilience and DC depict similar
characteristics to withstand the dynamics of an environment, particularly in the presence of
a disruption. Figure 7 depicts relatability amongst the two concepts, under the premise of
absorption, or ability to absorb the shock of a disruption, ability to adapt or response
capability, and an organization’s propensity to capitalize or innovate capacity, offsetting or
effectively recovering from turbulence or a disruption (Brusset & Teller, 2017; Yao, Y. &
Meurier, 2012).
Where DC and flexibility are simultaneously aligned, they contribute significantly to
competitive advantage and overall resilience (Wetering, Mikalef, & Pateli, 2017).
Application of DC, interchangeable with flexibility, can be achieved by an array of forms.
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Figure 7. DC & Supply Chain Resilience Traits (Yao, Y. & Meurier, 2012)
Saghafian and Van Oyen (2016) indicate dynamism as incorporating backup suppliers,
reinforcing production capacity and inventory before the disruption. However, Djelic and
Ainamo (1999) suggest dynamic capability to shift structurally into a flexible embedded
network during environmental turbulence. Alternatively, Helfat and Winter (2011) affirm
that dynamic capability is a systematic, repeated capacity to extend the firm’s assets. This
capability is inherently causing changes to the organizational resource-base and how assets
are combined and deployed. These adjustments directly represent a dynamic capability and
align with previous research, especially as firms must management complex bundles of
resources and inventory pools (Helfat & Winter, 2011; Teece et al., 1997).
Subsequently, this research distinguishes long-chain flexibility and dynamic capabilities
as adjoined concepts to enhancing supply chain resilience.
Conclusion
This research extends supply chain resilience literature, assessing the various impact of
resilience strategies. Explicitly, this research narrows identified gaps in the literature.
Leveraging general resilience strategies, this research provides a distinct, generalizable tool
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and methodology for decision-makers to quantifiably gauge resilience and response to
incremental investment changes in production capacity and inventory. Moreover, it
explores the infrastructure’s dynamic flexibility and long-chain potential. Lastly, it
advances supply chain resilience literature and hones a foundation for a more profound
understanding of network performance to a disruption.
III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
Simulation modeling was chosen as the methodology for assessing the system under
study. In recent years, supply chain resilience has been extensively studied via the
modeling approach. It provides the most flexibility and fluidity in understanding a realistic
environment of achieving system performance in the presence of disruptions (Carvalho,
Barroso, MacHado, Azevedo, & Cruz-Machado, 2012; Ivanov & Rozhkov, 2017; Melnyk
et al., 2014). Simulation permits supply chain behavior to be observable under various
conditions and design strategies to assess and improve resilience (Carvalho, Barroso, et al.,
2012). This research considers production capacity (repair capability and test cells), spare
inventory, and disruption responsiveness as key resilience investment levers. Subsequent
manipulation of these levers will yield the maximum pre-disruption and post-disruption
performance levels and overall resilience metric. Moreover, this research expounds on
previous research, particularly conducted by Femano et al. (2019) and Shannon (2020),
encompassing a more holistic F-16 engine repair network, 13 various nodes within the
network, and three tiers of repair.
The methodology is approached in the following manner:
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Figure 8. Methodology Flowchart
Conceptual Design
A simulation model was developed to replicate the holistic behavior of the F-16 engine
repair supply chain. It features 13 predominant repair network nodes (hereafter referred to
as bases), wherein each base maintains a respective individual production capacity,
inventory, repair capability, and test bench functionality. The distribution of resources
(spares) necessary for each location is equalized for each repair node. Table 2 illustrates
production capacity and resource allocation for the baseline network.
Simulation Model Development
The simulation was developed using SIMIO 11.0 simulation software and MATLAB.
SIMIO interacts with a myriad of secondary applications, affording access to a vast array of
methods and routines. Each simulation cycle generates an Excel workbook output for
analysis within MATLAB, as illustrated in Figure 9. This approach was applied by several
researchers, particularly Abar, Theodoropoulos, Lemarinier, & O’Hare (2017) and
Dehghanimohammadabadi & Keyser (2017).
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Table 2. Baseline System Allocation
Production Capacity
Base
Test Benches
1
2
2
2
3
2
4
2
5
2
6
2
7
2
8
2
9
2
10
2
11
2
12
2
13
2
Total
26

Inventory/Capacity
Spares
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
13

Within the realm of resilience, authors Iriondo, Estévez, Orive, & Marcos (2014) and
Vijayan, Harikrishnakumar, Krishnan, Cheraghi, & Motavalli (2020) implemented a
combined simulation and MATLAB approach.
Data Collection
The Air Force’s maintenance data repository Logistics, Installation, and Mission
Support-Enterprise View (LIMS-EV) was the model’s predominant data source.
LIMS-EV served as the prime mechanism for obtaining information about the USAF
supply chain’s F-16 engine posture. Specifically, subsystems within LIMS-EV such as
Weapon Systems, Supply Chain Management, and Engines Views were used to obtain the
necessary data for the model and data analysis. Like previous authors, namely Kontokosta
and Malik (2018) and Sarker, Yang, Lv, Huq, and Kamruzzaman (2020), this research
scopes the LIMS-EV data to model the Air Force F-16 engine network appropriately.
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Figure 9. SIMIO and MATLAB: Generalized Framework (Dehghanimohammadabadi & Keyser,
2017)

Additional data were obtained from the USAF: Life Cycle Management Center and 635th
Supply Chain Operations Wing to ensure realistic data assessment and modeling.
Table 3 illustrates the composite 2019 system parameters gathered and instituted in the
Baseline System model.
Table 3. 2019 System Parameters
Base Available N Depot N Depot_Pert TAI N Breaks N Breaks_Pert Breaks_Rate Hours Flown H Sorties Flown N Hours_Sorties Sorties_260
1
9.00
2.20
9.43% 19.00 191.00
12.00%
14.00
2,779.00
1,659.00
1.68
6.38
2
9.00
2.20
9.43% 19.00 191.00
12.00%
14.00
2,779.00
1,659.00
1.68
6.38
3
9.00
2.20
9.43% 19.00 191.00
12.00%
14.00
2,779.00
1,659.00
1.68
6.38
4
9.00
2.20
9.43% 19.00 191.00
12.00%
14.00
2,779.00
1,659.00
1.68
6.38
5
9.00
2.20
9.43% 19.00 191.00
12.00%
14.00
2,779.00
1,659.00
1.68
6.38
6
9.00
2.20
9.43% 19.00 191.00
12.00%
14.00
2,779.00
1,659.00
1.68
6.38
7
9.00
2.20
9.43% 19.00 191.00
12.00%
14.00
2,779.00
1,659.00
1.68
6.38
8
9.00
2.20
9.43% 19.00 191.00
12.00%
14.00
2,779.00
1,659.00
1.68
6.38
9
9.00
2.20
9.43% 19.00 191.00
12.00%
14.00
2,779.00
1,659.00
1.68
6.38
10
9.00
2.20
9.43% 19.00 191.00
12.00%
14.00
2,779.00
1,659.00
1.68
6.38
11
9.00
2.20
9.43% 19.00 191.00
12.00%
14.00
2,779.00
1,659.00
1.68
6.38
12
9.00
2.20
9.43% 19.00 191.00
12.00%
14.00
2,779.00
1,659.00
1.68
6.38
13
9.00
2.20
9.43% 19.00 191.00
12.00%
14.00
2,779.00
1,659.00
1.68
6.38

*Data masked for confidentiality*
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Baseline System Description
The baseline model incorporates 13 base nodes of the overall system and three echelons
of the repair network: Organizational (O-level), Intermediate (I-level), and Depot (D-level).
The model served as a fully integrated network in which system operations are codified,
replicating holistic broken engines. O-level repair is accomplished locally by back-shop
maintenance personnel. I-level repair requires outsourcing entity repair to a centralized
repair facility (CRF) for repair. CRF’s generally possesses additional repair capability not
present at the local level. In certain instances, the base may have both I-level and O-level
repair capability if the node also functions as a CRF. This model features two distinct
CRF’s, one for supporting CONUS nodes and another for OCONUS node support. D-level
requires overhaul repair of the engine, wherein bases will pack, wrap, and ship it to a
singular, centralized repair node.
Each engine (also referred to as ‘entity’) is assigned to an aircraft facilitating flying
operations based on 2019 flying data illustrated in Table 3. As engine breaks occur, the
entity is routed through the respective base repair chain, dependent on severity. Breaks
serve as the system interarrival entity, distributed about the number of aircraft allocated to
each base, the sortie quantity, flying hours, and respective break rate. Interarrival time of
entities is given by:

𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 = (

𝐹𝑖
)/(𝐴𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝑖 )
𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒

(Femano et al., 2019; Shannon, 2020)
where,
𝐹𝑖 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑖
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(1)

𝐴𝑖 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑖
𝑆𝑖 = 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠, 𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎 260 − 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑓𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑖

𝐻𝑖 = 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑖

Interarrival time also inherently considers the human element of sortie generation. As 𝐴𝑖
decreases, the model will fly fewer sorties. This acts as a natural balancer for system
performance and allows the model to reach steady-state flying operations.
At entity generation (break occurrence) following flying operations, the entity is sent to
flight-line maintenance to determine the break’s severity. The model designates four types
of severities, sequenced from one to four, stochastic in nature. Type one breaks are
considered repairable at the O-level whereas, type two and three breaks are deemed I-level
repair, and type four breaks are reserved for D-level overhaul. Table 4 visualizes the types
of severities, probability of severity, and respective repair echelon. Of note, each node
maintains a separate value for type three and four breaks, providing a more accurate
representation of probabilistic system engine severity. Following O-level engine repairs,
the simulation models the time for maintenance personnel to conduct a function test
utilizing a test bench, then reattach the engine into an available aircraft. Subsequent O-level
and D-level repairs will not transport the engine back to the originating node but transport
the entity to the base with the lowest relative percentage of available aircraft.
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Table 4. Severity and Repair Level
Severity Severity Mix Repair Level
1
0.85
O-Level
2
0.03
I-Level
3
*
I-Level
4
**
D-Level
*Derived by (1 – all other severities)
** Specific to base i Depot Percent (See Table 3)

This model approaches Aircraft Availability (AA) as a variable or metric comparable to
a commercial company’s competitive metric. This metric is calculated as:

𝐴𝐴 =

𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑂𝑅
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦

∗ 100

(2)

(Ingram, 2020)

Concerning the Air Force, AA provides the most noteworthy system-level measurement,
assessing the impact of aligning inventory in a service parts environment (Boone,
Craighead, Hanna, & Nair, 2013).
During an entity’s generation (i.e., engine break), one unit of OR is decremented from
the originating base, affecting AA as an aircraft is no longer capable of conducting a
mission. Following the engine break's repair, one unit of OR is incremented at the base
receiving the repaired engine. For example, if a Type 2 severity occurs at node four, it is
transported to a CRF for repair, and node four OR is decremented by one. After repair, the
CRF scans the system for the lowest relative node AA and determines node seven as
requiring the repaired engine. Subsequently, node seven is incremented by one OR.
Finally, each base is initially allocated one spare engine. Therefore, when an engine failure
occurs, maintenance immediately replaces the entity with a spare, if available, without any
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OR loss. When routing repaired entities, if a node chain receives an engine increasing OR
greater than the respective Total Active Inventory, the local spare inventory is increased,
and OR remains unchanged.
Model Verification and Validation
Simulation models are heavily reliant on their validity; therefore, objective methods are
essential to verify and validate simulation models. For verification, we are confronted with
a critical question: Does the system behave the way it is intended? Verification is achieved
by exhaustive execution of SIMO model trace functionality. Tracing allows for the critical
analysis of process logic, ensuring entities flow from node to node as intended. Validation
evaluates the relationship between the model and the real system. It questions: Does the
simulation produce performance measures or metrics comparable to the real system?
Validation of model frameworks was achieved by coordination with the primary experts
and conduits of F-16 engine repairs, Air Force Life Cycle Management Center.
Furthermore, output metrics such as AA and the number of breaks produced by the system
were compared with historical LIMS-EV data.
Scenario Design
The baseline model corresponds to the representation of the existing network system.
Other scenarios and designs were compared to the baseline in performance over a
predetermined timeframe to analyze the supply chain’s performance behavior. Collectively,
all scenarios were simulated through a 5,000-day time frame, encompassing an initial
3,500-day warm-up period. Due to the model's complexity, a substantial warm-up period
was necessary to eliminate significant performance fluctuations and assure steady-state
operations within the model. Following the warm-up, day 3500 serves as “new day 0” of
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steady-state network performance and disruption analysis, permitting a concentration on
transient states amid a disruption. Therefore, from day 0 to day 1100, steady-state is
assessed, followed by a randomized disruption occurring at day 1100. By day 1500, each
scenario has fully recovered, facilitating transient state progression and AUC's utilization
from day 1100 to 1500. Based on this approach, three transient periods are identified: (1)
Pre-Disruption, (2) Post-Disruption – Decline, and (3) Post Disruption – Recovery. The
Pre-Disruption stage is assessed from day 1000 to day 1100. Post-Disruption – Decline is
categorized as the time at which the disruption occurs until a specified response has been
enacted. Finally, Post Disruption – Recovery is when the response occurs until the system
performance has recovered (Femano et al., 2019; Shannon, 2020). Existing within the postdisruption period, the AUC metric quantifies the level of demand the network can meet
during the Post Disruption - Decline and Recovery periods. The AUC isolates three
segments to formulate resilience: (1) AUC – Decline, (2) AUC – Recovery, and (3) AUC –
Total. AUC – Decline is the total network performance under the Post Disruption – Decline
curve, AUC- Recovery is the total network performance under the Post Disruption –
Recovery curve, and AUC – Total is the cumulative network performance during all
disruption stages (Femano et al., 2019; Shannon, 2020). Figure 12 further illustrates the
transient states and applicable AUC periods.
The primary resilience levers within this research are production capacity, inventory,
and response time. As previously described in the literature review, these levers will be
utilized in unison to achieve the most significant resilience potential. Thus, scenarios will
vary in allocations of production capacity, inventory, and response time. Baseline structure
capacity is assessed up to a 30% increase, whereas production capacity is varied up to 50%
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of initial allocations. Such variations in resilience levers are organizational-specific and
require variations inherent to the network being assessed. These variations are most
appropriately aligned to analyzing investments with AA impact within the engine repair
and supply network. Finally, responsiveness to the disruption is analyzed at 10- and 60-day
values. Responsiveness values were selected based on Macdonald and Corsi (2013), who
outlined average expected discovery and recovery time, their responsiveness, and
disruption. Based on the substantial warm-up period, scenarios underwent 20 replications
to secure consistent overall data and ensure data outputs are centered within a 95%
confidence interval. Likewise, scenarios are measured based on the AUC metric and
respective AA. The AUC is utilized as the primary metric of resilience and representation
of system behavior over time, while AA provides how investments affect overall
competitive advantage. Table 5 outlines the developed scenarios.
Following each replication, SIMIO generates a comma-separated value (CSV) file,
wherein 500 CSVs are produced for one response, translating to 25 files for each design.
CSVs are then imported into MATLAB, which batches, fits, and executes the area under
the respective scenario curve. Following, MATLAB generates a table featuring pertinent
timeframe metrics associated with each scenario. Complete MATLAB coding is detailed in
Appendices B, C, and D.
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Table 5. Scenario Framework
Scenario

S ystem
Initial
Capacity

Recovery
S ystem
Production Scenario Initial
Capacity
Capacity

Recovery
Production
Capacity

1

1.1

13

1.1

2

1.1

14

1.1

1.2

15

3
4

1.00

1.20

1.2

1.3

16

5

1.4

17

1.4

6

1.5

18

1.5

7

1.1

19

1.1

8

1.1

20

1.1

9

1.2

21

1.3

22

11

1.4

23

1.4

12

1.5

24

1.5

10

1.10

1.30

1.3

1.2
1.3

**Scenario 0 - System Initial Capacity and Recovery Production Capacity = 1.00**
(Femano et al., 2019; Shannon, 2020)
Dynamic Long-Chain Flexibility Design
The design of the system is also pivotal to assessing resilience within the system. In
conjunction with adjustments to investments, this research considers a dynamic long-chain
flexibility design. This construct emulates the same design and process logic built of
baseline model with a singular exception in the repair routing of severity 2, 3, and 4
engines. Inherently, I-level and D-level nodes create a centralization or bottleneck of repair
capability.
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Figure 10. Baseline Network Design

Therefore, the long-chain model is dynamic as it will assess whether a CRF or D-level
repair queue is significantly backlogged. If so, it will redirect the entity to another CRF if a
repair can be achieved quicker. A D-Level perspective will scan the network of CRFs and
determine whether a repair can be accomplished quicker and route accordingly. The longchain flexibility design is recognized as a dynamic capability, capable of absorption system
functions and adapting appropriately. Figures 10 and 11 exemplify the structural difference
between the two system designs. Within each scenario, the disruption occurs at day 1100,
where repair capabilities at a specific base (node) are eliminated.
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Figure 11. Dynamic Long-chain (Flexibility) Network Design

After a predetermined delay, it is assumed all available aircraft at the location impacted
are equally dispersed to three separate bases within the nearest geographic proximity. The
model also assumes production capacity and inventory are irrecoverable and spent for the
simulation’s remaining duration. Moreover, process logic impedes I-level and D-Level
repaired engines from routing back to the impaired location as it is no longer operational
due to the disruption. Finally, supporting bases receive OR and Total Active Inventory
increases relative to the number of dispersed aircraft received.
Disruption Implementation
Assessing system performance, level of resilience, and transient states, each scenario
incorporates a disruption. This research applies the framework from previous literature to
quantify the effects of resilience levels or investments through three distinct timeframes.
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Figure 12 depicts the system’s resistance amid a disruption, decline of performance,
recovery measures, and new steady-state realization.

Figure 12. Performance Metrics & Disruption Time Periods (Femano et al., 2019; Shannon, 2020)

The system’s resilience to disruption is translatable to the Pre-Disruption state. Upon
initiating a disruption, the system performance level begins to decline, entering the PostDisruption Decline state. A Minimum Performance Level (MPL) is reached when
investments or allocations are inserted into the system, launching the Post-Disruption
Recovery state until a new Recovery Performance Level (RPL) is reached.
To assess the transient state and quantifiably analyze the drop and recovery in
performance, thus resilience, the AUC metric is utilized. The area above the curve indicates
lost performance in the event of a disruption, whereas AUC emphasizes collective
performance throughout the transient states (Femano et al., 2019). Therefore, to quantify
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system resilience, the achieved AUC is considered in proportion to the realized demand
over the disruption timeframe.

𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 =

𝐴𝑈𝐶𝑡
𝐷𝑡

(3)

(Femano et al., 2019; Shannon, 2020)
AUC is implemented within the provided designs through further analysis and results,
and the validity of transient system states is achieved.
IV. Analysis and Results
Chapter Overview
This research analyzes two network designs: baseline structure and dynamic longchain flexibility structure, wherein each initialized design tests transient states, disruption
response, recovery, and investments. Each design validates the requirement of
simultaneous investments in inventory and production capacity and subsequent effects on
AA, this research’s measure of competitive advantage. Designated disruption responses
(10- and 60 days) for each design activate predetermined recovery capacity allocations.
Thus, this research confirms the significance of predetermined asset allocation,
reactiveness, and recovery allocations as pivotal to post-disruption performance.
In conjunction with previous research, Figure 12, and “Scenario Design” section, three
distinct performance metrics are analyzed: (1)Pre-Disruption AA, (2) Minimum
Performance Level (MPL), and (3) Recovery Performance Level (RPL). Pre-Disruption
AA is assessed as the average daily AA rate from 1000 to day 1100. MPL is the network's
minimum level of performance as a result of the disruption. RPL is the average daily
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performance after the network has recovered. The interaction of these three metrics
provides a more profound understanding of overall system resilience. Emphasis is placed
upon maintaining performance following a disruption and meeting required demand or
maintaining competitiveness. Specifically, this emphasis is directed where Pre-Disruption
AA ends, when disruption impact is realized. Moreover, starting performance is pivotal in
overall performance throughout the transient states.
Baseline Design
Generally, a baseline model captures the current operational environment of its realworld structure. This model depicts the USAF F-16 engine repair network and limited
supply chain, affording awareness of the system's current environment and how it resists
and recovers from a disruption.

Figure 13. Baseline Design with Disruption
Figure 13 illustrates the system's steady-state and disruption at day 1100 before
investments in resilience levers. The figure shows the average AA Rate (Black line), the
50th percentile (Green lines), and the minimum and maximum AA Rates (Blue lines)
across all replications. Table 6 depicts the 10-day response output derived from the
scenarios established in Table 5. Each scenario symbolizes established investment levers of
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initial inventory capacity and recovery (production) capacity. Moreover, scenarios assigned
a value of 1.00 in either investment lever indicate respective current capability without
additional resilience investment.
Table 6 reinforces the importance of the network’s ability to maximize its PreDisruption AA rate in the event of a disruption. The transient states of the scenario are
quickly visible as the larger the starting AA, the more significant the AUC Decline. Thus,
as initial capacity investments occur, Pre-Disruption AA, AUC – Decline, and MPL also
increase. Naturally, a higher MPL indicates a more remarkable ability for the system to
support demand or maintain a competitive advantage within the Post-Disruption –
Recovery period following a disruption. Furthermore, RPL improves respective to the PreDisruption AA and directly reflects the simultaneous inventory and production capacity
investments. Thus, the network’s ability to withstand and recover from disruption is suboptimal when no investments or investments in singular resilience levers are made and
when a singular lever is manipulated (Femano et al., 2019; Shannon, 2020). Investments in
inventory initially realize a lesser impact than leveraging production capacity following a
disruption. Collectively, investments in recovery capacity realize the most significant
benefit to RPL within the baseline structure.
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Table 6. Baseline 10-Day Output

Investments
Scenario
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Initial
Cap

1.00

1.10

1.20

1.30

Recovery
Cap
1.00
1.05
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50

Post Disrup. Decline

Post Disrup. Recovery

Average AA

MPL

AUC-D

RPL

AUC-R

79.21%
79.21%
79.21%
79.21%
79.21%
79.21%
79.21%
80.22%
80.22%
80.22%
80.22%
80.22%
80.22%
80.95%
80.95%
80.95%
80.95%
80.95%
80.95%
82.16%
82.16%
82.16%
82.16%
82.16%
82.16%

67.47%
67.47%
67.47%
67.47%
67.47%
67.47%
67.47%
68.48%
68.48%
68.48%
68.48%
68.48%
68.48%
69.49%
69.49%
69.49%
69.49%
69.49%
69.49%
70.50%
70.50%
70.50%
70.50%
70.50%
70.50%

86.62
7.49
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.63
7.68
7.56
7.58
7.58
7.58
7.70
7.75
7.67
7.69
7.68
7.69
7.84
7.87
7.75
7.75
7.75
7.75
7.88
7.95

N/A
73.83%
73.95%
74.69%
74.63%
76.94%
79.16%
74.46%
74.71%
75.16%
75.65%
77.63%
79.54%
75.16%
75.91%
76.34%
76.53%
79.45%
82.23%
76.74%
76.48%
77.14%
76.92%
79.58%
81.85%

N/A
80.23
80.68
81.61
81.54
93.12
93.39
81.33
81.32
82.44
82.55
93.46
93.92
81.88
82.48
83.90
83.87
94.60
94.88
82.75
82.27
84.21
83.85
94.16
94.40

PreDisruption

Total
AUC
86.620
87.72
88.20
89.12
89.06
100.74
101.07
88.89
88.90
90.02
90.13
101.16
101.67
89.55
90.16
91.58
91.56
102.43
102.75
90.49
90.02
91.96
91.61
102.04
102.35

An organization’s ability to rapidly identify, adapt, and respond is crucial to the system's
performance before and following a disruption. From a competitive-advantage perspective,
responsiveness is a predominant factor in assuring an organization maintains capability and
competitiveness. Responsiveness is directly associated with the ability to activate
specifically designated asset allocations of recovery capacity. Table 7. Baseline Response
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(10 v 60-Days)and Figure 14 depict the consequences of prolonged disruption response on
overall system performance.
Table 7. Baseline Response (10 v 60-Days)

Investments
Response
Time
10-Day

60-Day

Initial Recovery
Cap
Cap
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30

Post Disrup. Decline

Post Disrup. Recovery

Average AA

MPL

AUC-D

RPL

79.21%
79.21%
79.21%
79.21%
79.21%
79.21%

67.47%
67.47%
67.47%
66.46%
66.46%
66.46%

7.51
7.51
7.51
11.24
11.25
11.24

73.95%
74.69%
74.63%
70.13%
72.68%
72.79%

PreDisruption

AUC-R Total AUC
80.68
81.61
81.54
76.65
77.26
77.30

88.20
89.12
89.06
87.89
88.51
88.54

Accelerated responsiveness is beneficial to the network resulting in a higher MPL and RPL.
Moreover, Total AUC or cumulative network performance during all disruption stages is
higher between the 10- and 60-day response times. It is assumed that the same recovery
allocations are provided at the response, but realistically, a lengthy response can be
substantially more costly and detrimental to competitiveness.
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Figure 14. AA: 10 v. 60-Day Response
Dynamic Long-Chain Flexibility Design
The second design capitalizes upon the concept of dynamic long-chain flexibility as
identified within the literature, allocating inventory and production capacity while
subsequently dispersing capability amid a disruption. Understandably, the baseline
construct is fundamentally dynamic and flexible, wherein specific nodes can perform OLevel and I-Level repair capabilities. Within this research, flexibility and dynamism are
further heightened, permitting certain CRFs to perform limited D-level repair during
periods of heightened demand. Conjoining the works of Jordan and Graves (1995) and
Saghafian and Van Oyen (2016), this research fuses dynamic capability and long-chain
flexibility to bolster resilience.
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Figure 15. Dynamic Long-Chain Construct
Within this construct, the CRF and respective Depot system can dynamically absorb the
shock of a disruption. As with the baseline design, the system will still assess the severity
of the break and route accordingly but will first analyze the network's state. The system
will assess which has the greatest queue of repairs with travel time and route to the quickest
CRF server for repair. Moreover, severity four breaks are still routed to the depot for repair
wherein the system will probabilistically assess whether the CRF can support the D-Level
repair. If the respective CRF queue, repair time, and transportation time are greater than
that of the depot, the entity is allocated to the CRF. Otherwise, the depot will assign the
entity to its queue for repair. Furthermore, this design is present before the disruption and
assessed throughout the transient states. Figure 15 visualizes this construct utilized within
this research and simulation.
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Table 8. Dynamic Long-chain 10-Day Output

Investments
Scenario
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Initial Recovery
Cap
Cap
1.00
1.05
1.10
1.00
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.10
1.30
1.40
1.50
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.30
1.40
1.50

PreDisruption AA
Average AA
79.21%
79.21%
79.21%
79.21%
79.21%
79.21%
79.21%
80.39%
80.39%
80.39%
80.39%
80.39%
80.39%
80.94%
80.94%
80.94%
80.94%
80.94%
80.94%
82.20%
82.20%
82.20%
82.20%
82.20%
82.20%

Post Disrup Decline

Post Disrup Recovery

MPL

RPL

AUC-D

AUC-R

68.48% 154.08
N/A
N/A
68.48% 47.99 74.30% 111.58
68.48% 48.14 75.17% 112.52
68.48% 48.53 76.21% 114.42
68.48% 48.49 76.07% 114.46
68.48% 51.49 81.88% 125.39
68.48% 51.49 81.45% 125.61
69.48% 48.68 75.95% 113.58
69.48% 48.73 75.91% 113.75
69.48% 49.11 76.87% 116.14
69.48% 49.23 77.20% 115.73
69.48% 52.25 82.36% 125.50
69.48% 52.25 82.65% 125.54
69.30% 48.99 76.03% 114.30
69.30% 49.31 76.68% 114.13
69.50% 49.77 78.12% 118.02
69.50% 49.79 77.92% 117.86
69.50% 52.61 83.63% 127.11
69.50% 52.61 83.32% 127.19
71.30% 49.73 77.09% 114.70
71.30% 49.42 76.26% 113.79
71.30% 49.97 78.15% 118.16
71.30% 49.88 78.14% 117.21
71.30% 53.43 83.23% 126.30
71.30% 53.43 82.73% 126.12

AUC Total
154.077
159.58
160.66
162.95
162.94
176.88
177.10
162.26
162.48
165.25
164.96
177.76
177.79
163.29
163.44
167.79
167.65
179.72
179.80
164.43
163.20
168.13
167.09
179.72
179.55

Similar to the baseline model, the dynamic long-chain flexibility design is analyzed
based on inventory and production capacity. Additionally, recovery responsiveness is
assessed and gauged based on overall network AA and AUC – Total. Table 8 further
outlines the output generated based on resilience lever allocations and 10-day recovery
response. Based on the output, simultaneous investments in inventory and recovery
capacity are also pivotal in achieving optimal resilience within the dynamic long-chain
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design. Investments in these resilience levers in union not only maximizes the cumulative
AA but increases Total AUC. Thus, throughout all stages, scenarios which increase
inventory and recovery capacity holistically outperformed scenarios activating a singular
lever. Moreover, higher investments in inventory generated higher Pre-Disruption AA and
MPL, leading to higher RPL values.
Responsiveness within the dynamic long-chain design also proved vital to influencing
cumulative AA. In every scenario, collectively responding within 10-days versus 60-days
yields higher MPL, RPL, and Total AUC.
Table 9. Dynamic Long-chain Response (10- v 60-Days)

Investments
Response
Time

Initial
Cap

10-Day
1.00
60-Day

Recovery
Cap
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.10
1.20
1.30

Post Disrup. Decline

Post Disrup. Recovery

Average AA

MPL

AUC-D

RPL

AUC-R

79.21%
79.21%
79.21%
79.21%
79.21%
79.21%

68.48%
68.48%
68.48%
67.47%
67.47%
67.47%

48.14
48.53
48.49
48.08
48.18
48.24

75.17%
76.21%
76.07%
72.32%
74.68%
74.79%

112.52
114.42
114.46
110.68
113.22
113.31

PreDisruption

Total
AUC
160.66
162.95
162.94
158.76
161.41
161.55

Table 9 and Figure 16 further validates responsiveness literature as an organization’s
ability to respond to a disruption affects its recovery trajectory and overall performance.
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Figure 16. Long-Chain 10- v. 60-day RPL (Total AUC and AA)
Baseline vs. Long-chain / 10- vs. 60-Day Response
Figure 17 outlines the baseline and long-chain structures for AA. As investments in
resilience increase, overall AA increases linearly. Furthermore, there are distinct
differences between: (1) 10- and 60-day recovery responses and (2) baseline and longchain structures. This research further employed the Paired T-Test to statistically test for
the difference to assess and validate differences within these two categories. A Paired TTest was selected to test for the difference between two dependent samples. Collectively,
four relationships were individually assessed at a 99.9% confidence level or alpha of 0.001.
Table 10 outlines these four tests, indicating significance throughout all scenarios and
designs as every derived T-statistic exceeds the critical two-tailed T-value.
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Figure 17. Baseline/Long-chain AA Comparison
Herein there are significant differences between the 10- and 60-day responses respective to
each design. As anticipated, this validates the differences in an organization’s
responsiveness to a disruption. The difference between designs is most notably astounding,
particularly between Baseline 60- and Long-chain 60-days.
Table 10. Baseline and Long-chain Paired T-Test

T-Stat
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

Baseline 10 -and Baseline 60-days
9.621
<.001
3.768

Baseline 10- and Long Chain 10-days
-6.375
<.001
3.768

T-Stat
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

Long Chain 10- and Long Chain 60-days
14.535
<.001
3.768

Baseline 60- and Long Chain 60-days
-41.016
<.001
3.768

These outputs further emphasize the importance of expedited response to disruption and the
impact the dynamic long-chain design has on network performance. Further validating the
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data, this research then considers each design and varying response as independent groups,
facilitating a test to determine statistical significance between means, also referred to as
analysis of variance (ANOVA). A one-way ANOVA performed and illustrated in Table 11
reveals a p-value of 4.349E-06, substantially more significant than the null hypothesis
rejection value of 0.001. Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis that the means are similar.
Moreover, with great probability, the ANOVA indicates a significant difference between
the various designs and response scenarios.
Table 11. One-Way ANOVA

Source of Variation
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

SS
0.024
0.068
0.092

df

MS
0.008
0.001

3
92
95
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F
P-value
F crit
10.676 4.349E-06
5.897

V. Conclusion and Future Research
This research facilitates a generalizable tool to quantify network resilience from defined
inventory and production capacity allocations and various structural designs amid a
disruption. Simultaneous investments within both resilience levers yield the most optimal
range of resilience wherein the inability to enact such levers within a timely manner
appropriately can be substantially detrimental to recovery.
This research has public, private, militaristic applicability as all environments
experience susceptibility to supply chain disturbances. This research employs discreteevent simulation to assess the USAF engine repair network's various structures. Moreover,
it assesses how investments in the resilience levers of inventory and production capacity
affect resilience based on AA's predefined metric. Simultaneous investment in these levers
provides increased resilience and improving recovery, achieving the same performance
before disruption and, in certain instances, improving performance following a disruption.
The develops a model reflective of the current F-16 aircraft engine repair network. This
design is reflective of similar designs across various airframes, platforms, and networks. A
baseline model is established with 1.00 inventory and recovery capacity, outlining the
network's current state with no investments. Resilience levers must be tailored to the
organization's needs but should be gauged based on which factors directly affect
organizational competitive advantage. Thus, appropriately selecting impactful resilience
levers is pivotal in understanding firms’ resilience to disruption. Two independent designs
were established: Baseline and Dynamic Long-Chain Flexibility, leveraging various
investments in resilience.
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Moreover, the designs were assessed based on organizational responsiveness to a
disruption. Organizations that employ similar methodology should vary investments based
upon the structure of the respective system. Maintaining a baseline approach with
simultaneous investment remains acceptable as a disruption mitigation strategy, yet optimal
resilience is reached when employing a dynamic long-chain approach.
This research adequately facilitates a means of metrically measuring system
performance and analyzing investments. Therefore, organizations across various domains,
environments, and industries are afforded a benchmark to understand and assess variables
that enhance competitive advantage, particularly concerning the supply chain. By
establishing a predetermined inventory range and simultaneously allocating resources,
firms can achieve the desired performance range. The AUC metric serves as a
generalizable tool or metric to appropriately evaluate network resilience through various
transient states of disruption. Additionally, firms are provided a more profound
understanding of how to employ necessary resilience levers to achieve the desired
performance.
As supply chain disturbances increase in number and frequency, affecting normal
operations, resilience is critical. Optimal resilience is achieved via simultaneous investment
in inventory and production capacity. Increasing inventory alone fails to promote recovery.
Allocating production capacity upon recovery is essential to achieve pre-disruption steadystate performance or a higher range of performance. However, suppose a firm lacks the
resources for recovery. In that case, inventory affords a suitable means of gradually
declining performance, permitting the firm to maintain the highest possible performance
level for a prolonged period of time (Shannon, 2020). Furthermore, shifting to a dynamic
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long-chain flexibility design is optimal for overall resilience. Permeating this flexibility
construct decentralizes operations and further bolsters resilience throughout the system.
Finally, organizational responsiveness cannot be overemphasized. While specific resources
may not become available until well into the recovery phases, immediate action with
available resources significantly impacts recovery.
Managerial Implications
As stated by Pettit et al. (2010) and various researchers aforementioned with the
literature, organizational decision-makers and leaders alike must strike a balance between
supply chain vulnerabilities and capabilities. This study extends the existing literature by
addressing how managers can systematically invest in resilience levers to bolster resilience.
More so, based on resource availability, managers can strategically adjust investments and
production capacity to achieve the desired performance range. For example, if there are
limited test benches that influence production capacity, managers can circumvent this by
increasing the spares' inventory to achieve approximately the same performance range.
Additionally, managers must consider the overall effects of investments on AA. A 10%
increase in either inventory or production capacity, specific to this network, generally
equates to a 1% increase in AA. Thus, managers must appropriately weigh the monetary
implications for subsequent AA improvements.
Assumptions / Limitations
A central assumption and limitation of this study is that all engine discrepancies feature
a singular break wherein it is feasible for an engine to experience multiple breaks. Therein,
all breaks, regardless of severity, result in a decrease in overall AA. From a realistic
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approach, specific severity breaks, particularly those within severity one tiers, may not
necessarily prevent an aircraft from being available, thus not affecting AA.
Opportunities for Future Research
This study's results permit a comparison of supply chain behavior before and following a
disruption under two resilience constructs. Both strategies effectively assess resilience and
determine the necessary course of action to withstand and recover from disruption, yet
there is an additional opportunity for further research. When a particular node is affected by
a disruption, it loses all repair capability, which may not fully be possible. Therefore, future
research can implement similar based analysis to assess how the system responds to a node
becoming reactivated following a disruption. Subsequently, salvageable resources have not
been examined to be dispersed to the remaining nodes. Dispersal of these assets could
further empower recovery rather than remain idle or nonmeaningful.
Moreover, costs have not been explored within this design. Understanding the costs
associated with implemented resilience further affords decision-makers in understanding
where to affordably placed their next resource investment. Finally, future research gains to
employ AUC within another context to validate its transferability and applicability across
multiple realms.
Conclusion
AUC is a powerful metric for decision-makers to suitably balance vulnerabilities and
capabilities. It yields a quantifiable resilience measurement when coupled with investments
in resilience levers, time, and system performance. Although an understanding of
investments is essential, synchronized investments in resilience levers are optimal.
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Organizations that align with a baseline construct still achieve performance benefits and
adequately resist disturbances, but further optimization is feasible when implementing a
decentralized dynamic long-chain flexibility strategy. Finally, speed of response validates
existing literature, as agility in intentional investments attains better performance recovery
and overall competitive advantage.
.
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Appendix A: Simulation Baseline Framework
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Appendix B: Output Batch Analysis Code (Femano, et al., 2019; Shannon, 2020)
agg_TS = [];
is_filename = 1;
for i=1:numel(spares) %spares
for j =1:numel(servers) %added servers
for k = 1:numel(ddays) %date of disruptionKeep
is_filename = 1;
for r = 1:reps
s = num2str(spares(i));
c = num2str(servers(j));
d = num2str(ddays(k));
try
filename = [Exp_name,
'_',s,'Spares','_',c,'Cap','_','DDay',d,'_Rep',num2str(r),'.csv']
[T, SL] = AggregateStateData(filename,time_unit);
size(T)
agg_TS = [agg_TS;repmat(spares(i), numel(T),1), repmat(servers(j),
numel(T),1),repmat(ddays(k), numel(T),1), repmat(r, numel(T),1), T,SL];
catch
warning('No such scenario. Going to next scenario');
is_filename = 0;
r = reps;
end
end
%
TS = agg_TS(agg_TS(:,1)==spares(i) & agg_TS(:,2)==servers(j), :);
%
T = TS(:,4);
%
SL = TS(:,5);
%
T = reshape(T, numel(T)/reps, reps);
%
SL = reshape(SL, numel(SL)/reps, reps);
%
%figure;
%
%plot(T(:,1), max(SL,[], 2));
%
hold on;
%
%plot(T(:,1), min(SL,[], 2));
%
SL_mean = mean(SL,2);
%
plot(T(:,1), movmean(SL_mean,12), 'LineWidth', 4);
%
axis([0 500 100 226]);
end
end
end
save(['agg_TS_' Exp_name], 'agg_TS');
parameters = [spares, servers, ddays reps, time_unit];
save(['parameters_',Exp_name], 'parameters' );
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Appendix C: Area Under the Curve Code (Femano et al., 2019; Shannon, 2020)
TS = agg_TS(agg_TS(:,1)==spares(1) &
agg_TS(:,2)==servers(1)&agg_TS(:,3)==ddays(1)&agg_TS(:,4)==1, :);
T = TS(:,5);
maxT = T(end);
time_unit = T(2)-T(1);
endT = (maxT-5*time_unit)/time_unit;
figure;
z =1;
key_measures = [];
%Fit Baseline disruption case first
for i=1:numel(spares) %spares
s = num2str(spares(i))
c = num2str(servers(1))
d = num2str(ddays(1))
[Exp_name,' ',s,' Spares',' ',c,' Servers',' ','Dday on ',d]
T=[];
SL = [];
for r = 1:reps
TS = agg_TS(agg_TS(:,1)==spares(i) &
agg_TS(:,2)==servers(1)&agg_TS(:,3)==ddays(1)&agg_TS(:,4)==r, :);
T = [T,TS(1:endT,5)];
SL = [SL, TS(1:endT,6)];
end
km = analyze_ts(T(:,1),mean(SL,2), T_dis, T_rec,0,1,0)
%area under disruption

fun_pre = @(x,Tpre)x(1)+Tpre*0;
%fun_dis = @(x,Tdis)(x(1)-x(3))*exp(-x(2)*(Tdis - x(4)))+x(3);
%fun_dis=@(x,Tdis)(x(1)-x(3))*(1-(1./(1+(exp(-x(2)*(Tdis-x(4)))))) )+x(3);
%fun_dis = @(x,Tdis)(x(1)-x(3))*(1+x(5)*(Tdis - x(4))).^x(6)+x(3);
fun_dis = @(x,Tdis)(x(3)-x(4))*exp(-((Tdis - x(5))./x(1)).^x(2))+x(4);
A_pre = km(1);
x_dis = km(2:end-1);
A_All_Min = km(end);
au_dis = integral(@(T)fun_dis(x_dis,T), T_dis, T_end);
au_rec = 0;
%spares(i),0,T_dis, T_rec, A_pre, k_dis, c_dis, A_max, A_dis, T_dis_begin
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key_measures = [key_measures;spares(i),0,T_dis, T_rec, km(1:end-1), au_dis, au_rec,
au_dis+au_rec, A_All_Min];
%subplot(numel(spares), numel(servers), z);
plot(T, fun_pre(A_pre, T), 'LineWidth', 2)
hold on
plot(T, fun_dis(x_dis,T), 'LineWidth', 2)
plot (T(:,1),mean(SL,2), 'LineWidth', .5)
axis([400 990 .3 1]);
title([s,' Spares',', ',c,' Servers']);
xlabel('Day');
ylabel('Available Aircraft');
end
figure;
A_dis = mean(key_measures(:,9));
for i=1:numel(spares) %spares
z=1;
for j =2:numel(servers) %added servers
for k = 1:numel(ddays) %date of disruption
s = num2str(spares(i))
c = num2str(servers(j))
d = num2str(ddays(k))
[Exp_name,' ',s,' Spares',' ',c,' Servers',' ','Dday on ',d]
%try
%
for r = 1:reps
%
TS = agg_TS(agg_TS(:,1)==spares(i) &
agg_TS(:,2)==servers(j)&agg_TS(:,3)==ddays(k)&agg_TS(:,4)==r, :);
%
if(numel(TS) > 0)
%
T = TS(:,5);
%
SL = TS(:,6);
%
km = analyze_ts(T,SL, 500, 564,0);
%
key_measures = [key_measures;spares(i),servers(j),k, km];
%
end
%
end
T=[];
SL = [];
for r = 1:reps
TS = agg_TS(agg_TS(:,1)==spares(i) &
agg_TS(:,2)==servers(j)&agg_TS(:,3)==ddays(k)&agg_TS(:,4)==r, :);
T = [T,TS(1:endT,5)];
SL = [SL, TS(1:endT,6)];
%
T = [T,TS(:,5)];
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%

SL = [SL, TS(:,6)];
end
T = T(:,1);
km = analyze_ts(T,mean(SL,2), T_dis, T_rec, A_dis, 1,1);

%
km = key_measures(key_measures(:,1)== spares(i) &
key_measures(:,2)==servers(j),:);
fun_pre = @(x,Tpre)x(1)+Tpre*0;
fun_dis = @(x,Tdis)(x(3)-x(4))*exp(-((Tdis - x(5))./x(1)).^x(2))+x(4);
fun_rec = @(x,Trec)(x(3)-x(4))*(1-exp(-((Trec - x(5))./x(1)).^x(2)))+x(4);
A_pre = km(1);
x_dis = km(2:6);
x_rec = km(7:end-1);
A_All_Min = km(end);
au_dis = integral(@(T)fun_dis(x_dis,T), T_dis, T_rec);
au_rec = integral(@(T)fun_rec(x_rec,T), T_rec, T_end);
key_measures = [key_measures;spares(i),servers(j),T_dis, T_rec, km(1:end-1),
au_dis, au_rec, au_dis+au_rec, A_All_Min];
subplot(1, numel(servers)-1, z);
%subplot(numel(spares), numel(servers)-1, z);
Tpre = T(T<=T_dis);
SLpre = SL(T<=T_dis);
Tdis = T(T>=T_dis&T<=T_rec);
SLdis = SL(T>=T_dis&T<=T_rec);
Trec = T(T>=T_rec);
SLrec = SL(T>=T_rec);
subplot(6,4, z)
plot(Tpre, fun_pre(A_pre, Tpre), 'LineWidth', 2)
hold on
plot(Tdis, fun_dis(x_dis,Tdis), 'LineWidth', 2)
plot(Trec, fun_rec(x_rec,Trec), 'LineWidth', 2)
plot (T(:,1),mean(SL,2), 'LineWidth', .5)
axis([400 990 .3 1]);
title([s,' Spares',', ',c,' Servers']);
xlabel('Day');
ylabel('Available Aircraft');
%z= z+1;
%catch
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% warning('No such scenario. Going to next scenario');
% end
end
z= z+1;
end
end
key_measures = real(key_measures);
save(['key_measures_', Exp_name],'key_measures');
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Appendix D: Time Series Plot Code (Femano et al., 2019; Shannon, 2020)
figure;
z =1;
%Get number of days in time series and time unit
TS = agg_TS(agg_TS(:,1)==spares(1) &
agg_TS(:,2)==servers(1)&agg_TS(:,3)==ddays(1)&agg_TS(:,4)==1, :);
T = TS(:,5);
maxT = T(end);
time_unit = T(2)-T(1);
endT = (maxT-5*time_unit)/time_unit;
for i=1:numel(spares) %spares
for j =1:numel(servers) %added servers
for k = 1:numel(ddays) %date of disruption
s = num2str(spares(i))
c = num2str(servers(j))
d = num2str(ddays(k))
[Exp_name,' ',s,' Spares',' ',c,' Servers',' ','Dday on ',d]
try
T=[];
SL = [];
for r = 1:reps
TS = agg_TS(agg_TS(:,1)==spares(i) &
agg_TS(:,2)==servers(j)&agg_TS(:,3)==ddays(k)&agg_TS(:,4)==r, :);
T = [T,TS(1:endT,5)];
SL = [SL, TS(1:endT,6)];
end
subplot(2,1, z)
%subplot(numel(spares), numel(servers), z);
plot(T(:,1), max(SL,[], 2), '-b', 'LineWidth', .5 );
hold on;
plot(T(:,1), min(SL,[], 2), '-b', 'LineWidth', .5);
%
SL_mean = mean(SL,2);
plot(T(:,1), prctile(SL,25, 2), '-g', 'LineWidth', .5);
plot(T(:,1), prctile(SL,75, 2), '-g', 'LineWidth', .5);
plot(T(:,1), mean(SL,2),'-k', 'LineWidth', 1.00);
%
plot(T(:,1), movmean(SL_mean,12), 'LineWidth', 4);
axis([1000 1500 .6 1.0]);
title([s,' Spares',', ',c,' Servers']);
xlabel('Day');
ylabel('Available Aircraft');
60

z= z+1;
catch
warning('No such scenario. Going to next scenario');
end
end
end
end
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